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Is the Human Zygote a Person? 
by 
Thomas Nelson, M.D. 
The author is Consultant for Adult Psychiatry, Department of Psychiatry, 
Mayo Clinic College of Medicine, Scottsdale, Arizona. 
In the June, 2004 edition of Mayo Clinic Proceedings, Louis M 
Guenin, J.D., Lecturer on Ethjcs in Science in the Department of 
Microbiology and Molecular Genetics, Harvard Medical School, discussed 
the morality of embryo use for research.! While rejecting a number of 
arguments in favor of embryo use for research as inadequate, he described 
embryonjc stem cell research as "virtuous if not obligatory" based upon his 
own "argument from nonenablement."2 The gist of Guenin's argument is 
that when a woman, "with her partner," declines intrauterine transfer of an 
embryo resulting from in vitro fertilization and donates the embryo to 
medicine, the embryo is "unenabled" to enter a uterus and develop into an 
infant and may be destroyed in the interest of scientific research. He 
assumes that an embryo lacking sentience, autonomy, and the ability to 
form preferences does not attain a soul; accordingly, he denies zygotic and 
embryonic personhood. Furthermore, he asserts that an unenabled embryo 
corresponds to no possible person, assuming that the decision to decline 
transfer is irrevocable and the embryo has "left parental control."3 
Several letters to the editor in response to Guenin's argument, 
including one by this author, were published in the September, 2004 Mayo 
Clinic Proceedings.4 I noted that the real issue is the ontological status of 
the zygote, since conception is the only reasonable moment of substantial 
change and all subsequent change (i.e., embryo, fetus, newborn, etc.) 
consists of growth and development, which is accidental change. Since the 
zygote differs substantially from the gametes, and is also human and alive, 
a human soul is present, since the soul is the principal of life in a material 
body and the form of the body. I also noted that the Vatican Document 
Donum Vitae (1987) explicitly and presciently rejected the argument from 
nonenablement, while affirming the human person as a substantial union of 
body and spiritual soul, the immediate creation of the spiritual soul by 
God, and the inviolability of the human person from the moment of 
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conception.s Another respondent emphasized that the mother lacks the 
authority from God to donate an embryo for research.6 A third respondent 
noted that aborted fetuses are unenabled and their tissue, along with that of 
other disadvantaged groups with limited abilities to form preferences, 
could also be exploited for research.7 
In his reply to these letters in the same issue, Guenin asserted that the 
"crucial classification is 'person' ."8 He denied the claim that human life 
begins at conception, noting that gametes and other cells are alive before 
conception. He also noted that saying a human is a union of body and soul 
"says nothing about when that union begins," essentially begging the 
question as to the moment in which the spiritual soul is infused and a 
human person is present.9 Personhood is thus the critical category 
determining whether the embryo should be respected as inviolable or may 
be destroyed for research. 
In elaborating his position, Guenin concedes that the embryo before 
and after the mother's declination of intrauterine transfer is ontologically 
the same, a fact obscured by his renaming the rejected embryo an 
"epidosembryo." [o. [[ He then makes a rather convoluted series of claims, 
including that the "modern Catholic Magisterium" has turned its back on a 
theological tradition of delayed ensoulment, has "abandoned the attempt to 
ascertain when a soul infuses," yet "makes it stand on zygotic personhood" 
based exclusively on modern genetic science, a position which would 
essentially deny that the soul is integral to personhood, since a genome 
"suffices for a person."12 
Actual Versus Possible Person 
Because he assumes that the contemporary Churc\l. asserts zygotic 
personhood, Guenin does not exploit Catholic theological speculation on 
delayed ensoulment as an argument for embryo stem cell research. 
Contrary to his claim, the Church has not made a definitive pronouncement 
on the moment human personhood is present, and even one of the most 
articulate current defenders of Church teaching against embryonic research 
concedes the possibility of delayed ensoulment. 13.14 Although Guenin is at 
pains to develop his "no possible person" argument against the Church's 
insistence that the embryo, even considered as a human life preparing for a 
soul (and thus personhood), has sufficient status to be protected, most 
embryonic research advocates would not scruple over distinctions between 
possible and actual personhood, but simply exploit the fact that the Church 
has not definitively committed itself to zygotic or embryonic personhood. [S 
Guenin denies actual embryonic personhood in a number of ways. 
As noted, he assumes that the embryo's lack of sentience and inability to 
form preferences and ends are deficiencies inconsonant with personhood. 
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This reveals a lack of appreciation for the distinction between accidental 
changes of quantity (growth) and quality (faculty development/use) and 
the substantial change of generation (conception) and corruption (death) . 
Substance is the stable ground upon which accidental change occurs. An 
infant is still a person even when not aware or yet able to reason. Even 
adults are frequently in states in which sentience, choice, and pursual of 
ends are in potency only (e.g. , sleep, anesthesia, etc.). 
Obfuscating the crucial distinction between substance and accident, 
Guenin claims that having the potential to become something valued is not 
the same as being it. "An acorn is not an oak; we, most of us, do not 
consider it wrong to sacrifice an unfertilized oocyte."16 His analogy of an 
embryo to an acorn is correct; the analogy of an embryo to an unfettilized 
egg is incorrect. An acorn and an oak tree are the same substance (e.g., 
Quercus borealis) at different stages of development. One may value the 
oak's accidental qualities more than that of the acorn 's, but they are the 
same substance. The embryo and the man are also the same substance 
(Homo sapiens) at different stages of development. One may value the 
adult 's qualities more than that of the child's or embryo's, but they possess 
the same dignity. On the other hand, the oocyte, while admittedly alive and 
human, is a part, not a complete substance, and thus not comparable to an 
acorn or an embryo. The union of egg and sperm - fertilization - is 
conception and the only reasonable moment of substantial generation 
when two parts become an individuated whole or substance. "Human 
development begins in the zygote stages and unfolds seamlessly from that 
stage through a series of natural internally self-directed development 
phases. There is no discreet identifiable moment, nor even series of events 
after the new organism comes into existence that can be construed as the 
beginning of a new organism."17 The seamlessness of hpman development 
beginning with the zygote involves accidental changes, which, according 
to St. Thomas, " ... concern not the being but the well-being of the thing 
generated."18 Guenin emphasizes a seamlessness of human life from 
gamete to zygote, but is then significantly silent regarding what moment or 
series of events is indicative of substantial generation to personhood, 
although he is quite sure that this does not occur before implantation, since 
nonenablement precludes "the attainment of a soul."19 
Guenin does admit the cogency of the argument for protecting "any 
possible person corresponding to a developing organism."20 He implies 
that "conceptuses enabled in the uterus" are, at least, possible persons, a 
status which may be sufficient for protection. Accordingly, he prefers to 
keep the focus on the embryo which has been rejected for intrauterine 
transfer, to which "no possible person" corresponds. In the process, he is 
silent about yet another embryo; namely, the one yet outside the uterus that 
is subject to a woman's permissible acceptation of intrauterine transfer. 
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Surely, by his reasoning such an embryo is a "possible person" despite the 
accident of its current location (petri dish vs. uterus) , unless he means to 
assert that implantation itself involves ontological change. This means that 
of two ontologically identical embryos in petri dishes, one may be a 
"possible person" and protected and the other "no possible person" and 
destroyed based exclusively on an intrapsychic event in another actual 
person, namely, the mother. As such, this argument is simply the timeworn 
pro-abortion argument that the mother's choice trumps everything, 
including ontology. The embryo, as with the fetus, is treated as property, 
not a person. The implication is that subjective choice even determines 
objective reality, indicative of an idealist epistemology and subjectivism 
run amuck. By using the contrasting adjectives "enabled" and 
"unenabled," and the contrasting nouns "embryo" and "epidosembryo," 
Guenin misleads the casual reader into thinking something has changed in 
the embryo, whereas what has actually changed is the mother's attitude 
towards the embryo, which is first permitted to develop as a product of in 
vitro fertilization, then not permitted to develop when intrauterine transfer 
is declined. Guenin appears to anticipate the potential absurdity of the all-
important status of embryonic possible personhood switching on and off 
as a mother changes her mind about intrauterine transfer, so he adds the 
qualifiers of (1) irrevocability to her decision and (2) the embryo leaving 
her parental control as requisites for his argument from nonenablement. 
But why would a woman pursue in vitro fertilization at all if the product 
pre-uterine transfer was not already a possible person? 
One of Guenin 's other arguments against embryonic personhood can 
be easily dismissed. It is his assertion that "an all-loving and all-merciful 
God" would agree with his argument from nonenablement! This was 
rightly criticized as reading God's mind by one of his rrrspondents.21 He 
does not seem to entertain the possibility that two wrongs do not make a 
right. If in vitro fertilization is wrong, embryo destruction can also be 
wrong, even if done to relieve human suffering, since the end does not 
justify the means. The fact that "we cannot promote any advantage of 
epidosembryos" does not compel, require, or justify their deliberate 
annihilation.22 
Human Being Versus Human Person 
To his credit, Guenin appreciates that the ethical issue in stem cell 
research is the personhood of the embryo, which is why he must engage 
Catholic thought and teaching, since the very notion of personhood was 
refined by the Church in the fourth and fifth centuries in response to 
various Christological heresies. As Pope Benedict XVI has written: 
" . . . the only way that the concept and idea of 'person' dawned on the 
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human mind was in the struggle over the Christian image of God and the 
interpretation of the figure of Jesus of Nazareth".23 
It is this author's contention that conceding a possible delay in 
personhood following procreation is actually a profound ontological and 
moral loophole that can be exploited by bioethicists such as Guenin , as 
well as others who would not have hi s scruples about possible persons. 
Ultimately, the category of possible person is irrelevant if the "crucial 
classification" is personhood, since, logically, a possible person is actually 
a nonperson. Accordingly, the issue of the actual personhood of the zygote 
and embryo is of critical and ultimate relevance for their defense. It will be 
important to review what the Magisterium actually teaches in this regard. 
Before undertaking such a review, it is important to clarify terms. 
According to the classic definition by Boethius, a person is an individual 
substance of a rational nature, a definition which clearly precludes 
consideration of cells, tissues, or organs as persons, since they are not 
substances but partS.24 In actuality, the notion of person is not subject to 
strict definition, since person denotes a "who," not a "what." Person 
conveys the ineffability of a unique and incommunicable identity, not just 
the essential attributes indicative of a class or group. Again, Pope Benedict 
XVI: "In this idea of relatedness in word and love, independent of the 
concept of substance and not to be classified among the ' accidents,' 
Christian thought discovered the kernel of the concept of person, which 
describes something other and infinitely more than the mere idea of the 
'individual' ."25 As more than an individual, a human person is both subject 
to and subjugates human nature, whereas "human being" refers to just the 
individualized nature. The former is a who with a what; the latter is just an 
individualized what, like a particular plant. The Church's notion of 
personhood is more profound than that advanced by Guenirf, who, adopting a 
pragmatic criterion of truth, reduces personhood to shorthand for how we 
should treat something for a given purpose, which implies that personhood 
is conferred by social consensus, not recognized as naturally inherent.26 
Consistent with the Church's notion of personhood, a being that is a 
possible but not actual human person, although individual and a substance, 
could not possess a rational or intellectual nature, which is the definitive 
note of personhood distinguishing man from animal. If there is no 
intellectual nature, there is no intellectual soul, since the soul is the 
principle of life in a material body and the form of the bodyy,28 Form is 
the determining principle in a material being, responsible for its 
"whatness." Accordingly, the hypothetical embryo, which may for awhile 
be a possible person but not an actual person and is devoid of an 
intellectual soul, must have an animal soul - more likely just a vegetable 
soul. This kind of soul (and there is only one soul) is material, educed from 
the potency of prime matter and reduced to the potency of prime matter 
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with substantial change; i.e., death.29 This begs the question as to in what 
wayan entity with a corruptible soul is even human if the very hallmark of 
human nature is absent, namely, an intellectual nature. For man, an 
intellectual nature requires a spiritual or incorruptible soul, since 
intellection cannot be reduced to a material organ. In actuality, an entity 
which is a possible person but not actually a person would be formally 
indistinguishable from a plant or animal and thus certainly not unique or 
incommunicable, irregardless of the human origin of its material cause; 
i.e., human gametes. 
Postulating an alive, human entity intervening between conception 
and human personhood might underscore the continuity of human life in 
human reproduction, but such an entity would testify to a discontinuity of 
human persons in procreation, suggesting that new human personhood is 
something that occurs later between God and parental biological material 
or, worse, arises from biological material alone, rather than something 
whose source is immediately, essentially and proximately personal: God, 
man and wife. The idea of "human life" is an abstraction from actual living 
human persons. In Aristotelian terms, an individual man is a first substance 
and life is a universal or second substance. Pope John Paul II explicitly 
stated that God's own image and likeness is transmitted in procreation, 
"thanks to the creation of the immortal soul," and he refers to many 
Biblical passages that speak of "the intimate connection between the initial 
moment of life and the action of God the Creator."30 What can this action 
be other than the infusion of the spiritual soul, the ontological ground of 
personhood? A possible person but actual nonperson would not be made in 
the image and likeness of God, Who is a Trinity of Persons. In vitro 
fertilization is abhorrent because it does not reflect that persons come from 
persons. Contraception is abhorrent because it makes tMe act of union 
between two persons impersonal in its import. 
What does the Magisterium Say? 
It is important to now review authoritative Church statements 
regarding the human embryo, statements which will be seen to move 
tantalizingly close to declaring the human zygote a person. 
The Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith's Declaration 
on Procured Abortion (1974) clearly states that ensoulment is a 
philosophical and moral problem not under the competence of scienceY 
Its defense of the embryo rests on two arguments: (1) if there is delayed 
ensoulment, human life still precedes ensoulment and must be respected; 
(2) " ... even if a doubt existed concerning whether the fruit of conception is 
already a human person, it is objectively a grave sin to dare to risk 
murder."32 I have just discussed the problems inherent to the first 
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argument. It overemphasizes the continuity of parental life in human 
procreation at the price of attenuating the substantial change of human 
generation to new being. It is also not persuasive for bioethicists like 
Guenin who make their stand on personhood. It is essentially the argument 
that the embryo is precious because it uniquely may become a human 
person and is a "possible person," and so is worthy of protection, an 
argument Guenin counters by his assertion that the unenabled embryo has 
no such destiny. As previously discussed, he counters the second argument 
that the embryo may actually be a person with a number of, ultimately, 
ineffecti ve counterarguments. 
Guenin attributes two actually contradictory positions to the 
Magistelium: (1) it has declared that ensoulment is a matter that will never 
be established; (2) it has declared that a person is a genome.33.34 Both 
attributions are incorrect. Regarding the first, the pertinent passage he 
cites, footnote 19 from the Declaration on Procured Abortion, states that 
ensoulment " ... .is a philosophical problem from which our moral 
affirmation remains independent for two reasons: (1) supposing a belated 
animation, there is still nothing less than a human life, preparing for and 
calling for a soul in which the nature received from parents is completed; 
(2) on the other hand, it suffices that this presence of a soul be probable 
(and one can never prove the contrary) in order that the taking of life 
involved accepting the risk of killing a man, not only waiting for, but 
already in possession of his soul."35 Another translation of the second point 
reads " .. .. on the other hand, it suffices that the presence of this soul be 
probable (and the contrary will never be established) in order that .. .. "36 In 
other words, the Declaration actually says it can never be proved that the 
soul is not present, not that the presence of the soul can never be 
established, which is Guenin's claim.37 , 
With regard to Guenin's second attribution, that the Church has 
declared a person is a genome, the Declaration merely states that modem 
genetic science "brings valuable confirmation" to the "perpetual evidence" 
that fertilization starts "the life of a new human being with its own growth," 
a life distinct from the parents.38 Science is thus employed in support of the 
"perpetual evidence" of philosophical analysis that life begins at 
conception, a moment of substantial generation of a new human being, a 
fact which constitutes the Declaration's first argument in defense of the 
embryo. The new genome may be a sign of human personhood, arguably 
the material cause, but certainly not the formal cause, which is the soul. 
The Declaration does not assert personhood based upon a new genome. 
The key passage regarding the personhood of the zygote in The 
Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith 's Instruction on Respect 
for Human Life in its Origin and on the Dignity of Procreation (Donum 
Vitae, 1987) reaffirms that ensoulment is not under the purview of science: 
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"Certainly, no experimental datum can be in itself sufficient to bring us to 
the recognition of a spiritual soul; neveltheless, the conclusions of science 
regarding the human embryo provide a valuable indication for discerning 
by the use of reason a personal presence at the moment of this first 
appearance of a human life: how could a human individual not be a human 
person?"39 (emphasis added) While acknowledging that the Magisterium 
"has not expressly committed itself to an affirmation of a philosophical 
nature" regarding zygotic personhood, this passage forcefully asserts the 
plausibility that the human zygote actually is a person, which would 
support the Declaration's second argument in defense of the embryo.40 
This assertion is based upon the use of reason (i.e., philosophical thought), 
which science subserves by measuring quantifiable aspects of material 
change. This is not science "proving" personhood; rather, it is science in 
its proper role assisting common sense to identify the presence of a new 
substance or the physical correlates of a substantial change. Philosophical 
notions such as substance, in turn, subserve theology (as in the doctrine of 
Transubstantiation). Identifying the presence of a new substance does not 
prove the infusion of an immortal soul by God; such an event is accessible 
to faith alone. Science and philosophy can support faith, but do not replace 
it. 
Having moved to the brink of declaring that the human zygote is a 
person based on philosophical principles, Donum Vitae insists that it be 
treated as a person: "The human being is to be respected and treated as a 
person from the moment of conception; and therefore from that same 
moment his rights as a person must be recognized, among which in the first 
place is the inviolable right of every innocent human being to life."41 Note 
that respect for human life follows from the assumption of human 
personhood; human personhood is not described as sOIlfething secondary 
to, or later than, human life. Donum Vitae also explicitly rejects the 
argument from nonenablement: "The law cannot tolerate - indeed it must 
expressly forbid - that human beings, even at the embryonic stage, should 
be treated as objects of experimentation, be mutilated or destroyed with the 
excuse that they are superfluous or incapable of developing normally" 
(emphasis added).42 
The papal encyclical letter, Evangelium Vitae (1995), quotes the 
passage from Donum Vitae containing the crucial interrogative, "how could 
a human individual not be a human person?", but reiterates that the 
Magisterium has not "expressly committed itself' to a philosophical 
affirmation of personhood for the result of human procreation from the first 
moment of its existence; i.e., the zygote.43 Nevertheless, Pope John Paul II 
appears to assume the personhood of the zygote in several passages. He 
refers to the modern tendency to "disguise certain crimes against life in its 
early or final stages by using innocuous medical terms which distract 
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attention from the fact that what is involved is the right to life of an actual 
human person."44 In referring to the Church's "desire to promote a human 
State," he asserts the "unconditional respect for the right to life of every 
innocent person - from conception to natural death" as a pillar for civil 
society.45 
Development of Doctrine? 
Given the challenge to the personhood of the zygote as reflected by 
pervasive embryonic stem cell research, the denial of such personhood by 
many bioethicists, and the grave implications of such nonrecognition for 
the temporal and eternal existence of countless tiny human beings, is not 
this the moment for an authoritative development of Church doctrine on 
the personhood of the product of human procreation from the first moment 
of its existence? Such a development would not imply a new addition to 
the deposit of faith or merely a syllogistic conclusion drawn from that 
deposit, but rather a making explicit of what is implicit in Church teaching 
from the beginning, an uncovering of the recondite and a manifestation of 
the import of its perennial teaching in the face of modem challenges to 
personhood. 46 The Church's (1) venerable teaching on the sanctity of 
human life from the moment of conception, (2) proscription of abortion at 
any stage, (3) development of the very notion of person in response to 
Christologicai heresies, (4) deliberate employment of the word pro-
creation, and (5) insistence that the zygote be treated as a person are a 
sufficient basis upon which to affirm that the product of conception, the 
human zygote, is a person. Such an affirmation would be consistent with 
modem science, philosophically reasonable, and theologically consonant 
with progressive statements ofthe Magisterium. It also appears practically 
imperative in the face of embryonic stem cell research, abortifacient pills, 
in vitro fertilization, human cloning, heterologous embryo transfer, and the 
whole vast panoply of modem assaults on the sanctity of human 
procreation. 
Is it quixotic to anticipate a future declaration of the Magisterium to 
the effect that under the exigencies of modem assaults on personhood, 
consistent with the deposit of faith, and making explicit what is implicit in 
the dogma of the Immaculate Conception, "a complete, rational, human 
soul is infused directly by God at the first moment of human conception 
and a human person is immediately present who is destined to exist for all 
eternity"? 
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